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A CLOSER LOOK AT BOWERS v. HARD WICK:
STATE AND FEDERAL DECISIONS




Although the United States Supreme Court was "quite
unwilling" 2 to announce a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy in 1986, the Court specifically left the
question of whether criminal sodomy laws should be repealed or
invalidated for the state legislatures and state courts to decide.
3
However, the Court did not entirely exclude the possibility that it
might review similar issues in the future. In fact, at the time of this
publishing,4 the Supreme Court is deliberating on a case from
Texas that challenges the constitutionality of a criminal statute
which prohibits consensual homosexual activity.
5
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit's holding that the Georgia anti-sodomy statute at
issue violated a federal fundamental right to "private and intimate
association" found in the Ninth Amendment6 and the Due Process
Clause 7 of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 The majority found that
1B.A. cum laude 1999, St. Joseph's College, (NY); J.D. Candidate Dec. 2003,
Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro Law Review Research
Editor 2002-2003. This article was selected for publication from submissions to
Touro Law Review's 2001 applicant writing competition.
2 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
3 Id. at 190; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 n.2 (1973) (Stewart J.
concurring) ("[T]he protection of a person's general right to privacy - his right
to be let alone by other people - is... left largely to the law of the individual
States.") (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967)).
4 Spring, 2003.
5 Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tx. App. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
661 (Dec 2, 2002). The Supreme Court heard argument in the case on March
26, 2003.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IX, which states "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people."
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which states in pertinent part "[N]or shall any
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the federal constitutional line of privacy cases did not go so far as
to protect individuals from the states proscribing private sexual
conduct between consenting adults. 9 Ten years later, when the
issue was again before the Georgia Supreme Court, it deferred to
the state legislature and upheld the same statute at issue in
Bowers. 10 Just two years later, the same Georgia Supreme Court
reversed itself and held that the statute violated the privacy
guarantees of the Georgia Constitution."
Until 1961, all fifty states outlawed sodomy. 2 By the time
of the Bowers decision, in 1986, twenty-four states, as well as the
District of Columbia, still criminalized private consensual
sodomy.' 3 Today, only eleven states' 4 (plus Puerto Rico) continue
to criminalize sodomy in general, and another four' 5 specifically
criminalize same-sex sodomy.' 6 There are now twenty-six states
and the District of Columbia that have legislatively repealed
8 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (finding a right of
privacy, "whether it be in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions on state action.., or in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people... ," broad enough to encompass a woman's
rifht to choose).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.
10 Christensen v. State, 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996).
1" See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (finding that male
appellant could not be convicted for performing an unforced act of sexual
intimacy with another man legally capable of consenting thereto in the privacy
of his home).
12 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193. Although definitions have varied from time to
time and state to state, sodomy laws for the general purposes of this article refer
to the conduct of oral or anal sex between a man and a woman and/or between a
man and a man.
'31d.
14 Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia.1S Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas.
16 American Civil Liberties Union, Crime and Punishment in America: State
by State Breakdown of Existing Laws and Repeals, available at
http://www.aclu.org/lesbiangayrights/lesbiangayrights.cfm?id=5028&c=41
[hereinafter Crime and Punishment] (last visited April 29, 2003).
[Vol 19
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sodomy laws and another nine1 7 states where laws have been
struck down by the courts.'
8
Federal and state challenges to laws that target or affect
same-sex conduct and relationships take a variety of forms. Such
laws are claimed to violate not only the Due Process Clause and
the Ninth Amendment, but also the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 19 the Establishment and Free Speech
Clauses of the First Amendment, 20 the Eighth Amendment,21 and a
host of other federal and state constitutional provisions such as the
Privileges and Immunities Clause 22 and even the fundamental right
to participate in the political process."
23
The Bowers decision essentially invited a range of litigation
- and not just on the state level. The Court rejected the
respondent's argument that moral beliefs provided no rational basis
for the law and refused to find a fundamental right that includes
engaging in homosexual sodomy.24 However, the Court's decision
17 Arkansas (2001), Georgia (1998), Kentucky (1992), Maryland (1999),
Minnesota (2001), Montana (1997), New York (1980), Pennsylvania (1980),
and Tennessee (1996).
18 See Crime and Punishment, supra note 16.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which states in pertinent part "No State
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (finding the state
constitutional amendment at issue unconstitutional on federal equal protection
grounds).
'o U.S. CONST. amend. I, which states "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech . . ." See, e.g., Stewart v. U.S., 364 A.2d
1205,1208-09 (D.C. 1976) (arguing that the sodomy statute at issue violates the
Establishment Clause).
21 U.S. CONST. amend VIII, which states in pertinent part "cruel and unusual
punishments [shall not] be inflicted." See, e.g. State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d. 501,
5 13-17 (La. 2000).
22 U.S. CONST. Amend. XI, which states in pertinent part, "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." See, e.g., Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences
Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 448 (Or. 1998) (denying benefits to same-sex couple
violated state privileges and immunities clause).
23 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996) (rejecting the theory of
infringement of a fundamental right but affirming the state court decision on
ec~al protection grounds).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. In its holding, the Court stated that "[the
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was limited to the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 The Court implied
that the issue may be heard again in the future under the Equal
Protection Clause and under the Eighth and Ninth Amendments.
26
The legal landscape regarding sexual conduct is changing,
and the trend is towards protecting adult intimate conduct that is
private, non-commercial and consensual2 7 However, the issues are
easily confounded with politics, 2 8 religion, 29 and morality; 30 but
they need not be. If there is any right of privacy, it should
certainly cover an individual's most private and intimate activities,
including the means of sexual gratification in his or her own
home. 31 If such a right exists at all, under state and federal equal
protection guarantees, it must apply to all such intimate activities,
including engaging in private consensual homosexual conduct.
Historically, the Supreme Court has developed an extreme
privacy philosophy, based on the Fourth Amendment,32 to protect
individuals from unreasonable searches by the government. Recent
should be declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the
sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis." Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 196 n.8. In a final footnote, the Court pointed out that "[r]espondent
d[id] not defend the judgment below based on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause, or the Eighth Amendment." Id.
27 See supra text accompanying notes 11-18. But see Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d. at
362 (stating that the Texas Court is not persuaded by such 'cultural trends' or
'political movements').
28 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992) (discussing
the court's legitimacy in face of political pressures and the importance of
principled justification in decision making).
29 See, e.g., Stewart, 364 A.2d at 1208-09 (discussing the relation of religious
doctrine and legislative action).
30 Compare Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-6 (1961) (finding moral
soundness is a traditional state concern) with People of the State of New York v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 489 n.3, 415 N.E.2d 936, 951 n.3 (1980) (discussing
why penal law is not a medium for moral or theological views).
31 See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1985). (Goldberg, J.
dissenting) (discussing the "blatant" constitutional violation of intruding into the
private sex lives of fully consenting adults); Stewart, 364 A.2d at 1207 (arguing
that the sodomy statute deprives the class of its "primary avenue of sexual
gratification); Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 487, 415 N.E.2d at 939-40 (discussing how
the right of privacy has been applied to individuals in their own homes).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, which states in pertinent part "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
4
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decisions refer back to and reaffirm centuries-old strictures against
"invasions on the part of the government and its employe[e]s of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."33 " 'At the
very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.' "34 Dissenting in a case where the Court
upheld the practice of wire-tapping private telephone conversations
by federal agents, Justice Brandeis quoted Justice Field from 100
years before Bowers:
Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and
happiness than the right of personal security, and
that involves, not merely protection of his person
from assault, but exemption of his private affairs,
books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny
of others. Without enjoyment of this right, all other
rights would lose half their value.
3 5
In Stanley v. Georgia,36 the court decided that a state
generally could not prevent an individual from possessing and
viewing obscene material in his own home. The case was decided
on First Amendment grounds, but the appellant's asserted right
could also be claimed under the privacy rights found in the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.37  In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Court discussed liberty and privacy in
relation to the Fourteenth Amendment:
These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
33 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting Boyd v. U.S., 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
34 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. U.S.,
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
35 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475 n.3 (1928) (quoting In re
Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250 (1887) (emphasis added)).
36 394 U.S. 577, 559 (1969).
37 Id. at 565 ("[Appellant] is asserting the right to satisfy his intellectual and
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define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under
the compulsion of the State.
38
II. THE BATTLE OF THE BRANCHES:
THE JUDICIAL v. THE LEGISLATIVE
Since the issue of proscribing and controlling same-sex
intimate conduct and relations has been left to the states, a wide
range of government acts and decisions resulted. Many courts
have deferred to the legislature where sodomy statutes or
extending rights in the same-sex context are concerned. Prior to
the Bowers decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals discussed
the role of the courts and the legislature in terms of changing views
on sexuality: "If the revolution in sexual mores that appellant
proclaims is in fact ever to arrive, we think it must arrive through
the moral choices of the people and their elected representatives,
not through the ukase of this court." 39 In a Louisiana Supreme
40Court case, the criminal sodomy statute was upheld as the court
deferred to the legislature:
[O]ur constitution is not to be subject to judicial
amendment to express whatever a majority of this
court happens to conclude at any given time is the
more enlightened viewpoint on a particular
controversial issue.... [T]his court would not be
alone in interpreting a state constitutional right to
privacy so broad as to include engaging in oral and
anal sex. What this fails to acknowledge, however,
is that most states in which consensual sodomy is
no longer a crime achieved that result "by
38 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (discussing, in relation to abortion, the "conventional
constitutional doctrine that where reasonable people disagree the government
can adopt one position or the other.").
39 Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
there was no violation of privacy or equal protection in the Navy's policy of
mandatory dismissal of homosexuals from service).40 Smith, 766 So. 2d. 501.
188 [Vol 19
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legislative repeal of their laws criminalizing
sodomy."4
In Romer v. Evans, where the Equal Protection Clause was
found to prevent Colorado from banning legislation to protect
rights based on sexual orientation, Justice Scalia, in his dissent,
spoke of the successful efforts of "a politically powerful minority
to revise [traditional sexual] mores through the use of the laws. ' '4
He went on to say, "[t]his Court has no business imposing upon all
Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which the
Members of this institution are selected, pronouncing that
'animosity' toward homosexuality ... is evil. ' ' 3 However, it is the
business of the judicial branch - the Supreme Court in particular -
to determine what the law is, and whether laws or legislative acts
are constitutional or invalid."4 Judgments striking down laws can
certainly continue in the traditional way, based on reason and
fairness and precedent, without unjustly imposing judges' "elite"
values. "When it becomes clear that a prior constitutional
41 Id. at 510-11 (quoting Christensen, 468 S.E.2d. at 190).
42 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); Smith,
766 So. 2d. at 519 (Calogero, J., dissenting). This judge articulated the
legislative /judicial province argument as follows:
I am not oblivious to the majority's argument that is it not the
province of this Court to legislate social policy or to determine
whether the criminal laws enacted by the Legislature are wise
or desirable. And surely our legislature is authorized to make
public policy determinations and to enact laws to further those
policies. However, the legislature cannot validly enact a law
that impermissibly infringes upon a constitutional guarantee.
Indeed the very reason for elevating certain protections to the
level of a constitutional guarantee is to ensure that the state
does not infringe upon those protections. And when there is
doubt as to the scope of protection afforded by a constitutional
guarantee, it is the province, and in fact, the duty of this Court,




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003
TOURO LAW REVIEW
interpretation is unsound [the judiciary is] obliged to reexamine the
question.
' 45
Justice Blackmun discussed the relevance of justices'
values in Roe v. Wade by quoting Justice Holmes' dissent in
Lochner v. New York: 46 "The Constitution is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking,
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the
United States. In Powell v. State, the Georgia case that struck
down the criminal sodomy law, the court was willing to overturn a
legislative act that "carries with it a presumption of
constitutionality that is overturned only when it is established that
the legislation manifestly infringes upon a constitutional provision
or violates the rights of the people." 48 Although the judiciary
sometimes must, and sometimes just does defer to the state
legislature on controversial social issues, progressive state courts
are willing to examine and strike down legislation if there is
evidence of discriminatory classifications or other violations of
rights said to be held by the people.49
Differences in views and conflicts in law between different
states are predictable' in our system of federalism, but the law
becomes more puzzling when the conflict of views is within the
same state. In Hawaii, for instance, the Supreme Court subjected a
marriage provision barring same sex marriages to strict scrutiny.5 °
That would have made Hawaii one of the first states to legalize
same sex marriages, but the holding was overturned by a
constitutional amendment.
51
41 Casey, 505 U.S. at 955 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (overruling precedent that is only two years old,
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).46 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)).
47 id.
48 Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Miller v. State, 472 S.E.2d 74, 77 (Ga.
1996)).
49 See Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 494, 415 N.E.2d at 943-44 (striking down criminal
sodomy laws six years before the Bowers decision).
5o Baer v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
51 HAW. CONST. art 1. §23 (amended 1997), which states "The legislature shall
have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples."
[Vol 19
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The opposite result was achieved in Vermont as the
legislature there created "civil unions"52 for same-sex couples after
the state's Supreme Court found that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the benefits and protections of marriage violated the
"common benefits" clause, the Vermont version of equal
protection.53 This now raises the question of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the federal Constitution,54 and whether other
states should or will recognize same-sex marriages from states like
Vermont. This question seems to have been answered for now, by
the Defense of Marriage Act, which allows states to limit
recognition of marriages to those between a man and a woman.
55
This federal legislative action seems to be in direct conflict with
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and its constitutionality is
therefore suspect.
IlL. POLICE POWER, MORALITY, AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS
There is no question that states can criminalize and regulate
conduct that directly affects other citizens' physical safety or right
to privacy5 6 and there is no question that morality has often been at
the heart of state legislation and enforcement. 5 The question is:
52 VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15 § 1202 (2002) which states in pertinent part, "For a
civil union to be established in Vermont, it shall be necessary that the
parties... be of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of
this state."
53 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d. 864 (Vt. 1999).
54 U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1 which states "all states must recognize the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state."
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (2000), which states in pertinent part, "No
State... shall be required to give effect to any public act, record or judicial
proceeding of any other State... respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State ...."
56 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (stating "[t]hat the
state may do much, go very far indeed, in order to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally and morally is clear; but the individual has certain
fundamental rights which must be respected.").
57 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (stating that "[t]he law... is constantly based
on notions of morality."); see also, Stewart, 364 A.2d at 1208-09 (discussing the
religious basis of sodomy laws, and how religious tenets become "part of the
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when is morality a justifiable basis for such state action?58 The
history and tradition of proscription are often cited as reasons for
continuing enforcement of sodomy statutes even if the reasons for
the original proscription are no longer applicable. Although the
Georgia Supreme Court struck down the sodomy statute at issue in
Bowers with the 1998 Powell decision, the court had upheld it only
two years earlier in the 1996 Christensen decision. The majority
in Christensen disagreed with dissenting Justice Sears' argument
that outdated historical and religious notions of morality should not
control today's decision making:
The sole basis asserted by the State in support of its
sodomy statutes is its moral interest in condemning
acts of homosexual sodomy. In support of this
argument, the State asserts that such acts are
proscribed by Judeo-Christian values, and were
punishable during the Middle Ages and
Reformation. Succinctly stated, the State's position
is that the majority has the right to criminalize
sexual activity that it finds immoral, without regard
to whether the activity is conducted in private
between consenting adults and is not, in and of
itself, harmful to others or the participants.
5 9
"Police power is the governing authority's ability to
legislate for the protection of the citizens' lives, health, and
property, and to preserve good order and public morals."0
Morality is often based on tradition or religious beliefs and the
states have offered a multitude of reasons for defending laws
against sodomy and homosexual relations. The protection of
marriage and public morality as well as protection against physical
harm of the participants was invoked by New York State but held
insufficient to justify the sodomy statute in Onofre.61 The dissent
s See Poe, 367 U.S. at 550 ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police, which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment, is basic
to a free society.") (quoting Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27 (1949).
" Christensen, 468 S.E.2d at 195 (Sears, J., dissenting).
60 Powell, 510 S.E.2d 18 at 25 (citing Hayes v. Howell, 308 S.E.2d 170, 176
(Ga. 1983)).
61 Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 488-89, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41.
192 [Vol 19
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in the Texas Courts of Appeals decision now under review by the
U.S. Supreme Court questioned whether "the discouragement of
behavior historically perceived to be immoral, and the promotion
of family values," are legitimate state purposes rationally related to
the criminalization of same-sex sodomy.62 Although rejected by
the U.S. Supreme Court, the "primary rationale" offered by
Colorado in Romer was "respect for other citizens' freedom of
association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers
who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality. ' '63 In
Louisiana, the legislature was held to be within its constitutional
authority to proscribe consensual and private oral and anal sex,
even between opposite sexes, because it is "legislatively
determined to be morally reprehensible." 64
As we can see, morality as a basis for legislation will not
always be upheld. Even when legislation is deemed invalid by the
courts or repealed by the legislature, that does not mean that the
conduct in question becomes any more moral or socially
acceptable. As pointed out by Justice Scalia in his dissent in
Romer, "The society that eliminates criminal punishment for
homosexual acts does not necessarily abandon the view that
homosexuality is morally wrong and socially harmful; often,
abolition simply reflects the view that enforcement of such
criminal laws involves unseemly intrusion into the intimate lives of
citizens., 65 The dissent in the Christensen case pointed out: "To
say that an act is entitled to constitutional protection in no way
condones the act itself. Indeed, a great deal of behavior many find
intolerable and even immoral is not subject to criminal prohibition
under our constitutional system."'6 The dissent goes on to quote
John Stuart Mill: "Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each
other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each
other as seems good to the rest." 
67
It may be that the law can more precisely define the bounds
of privacy as it recognizes an individual's personal and intimate
62 Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 372. (Anderson, J., dissenting).
63 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
64 Smith, 766 So. 2d at 508.
65 Romer, 517 U.S. at 645 (Scalia J., dissenting).
6 Christensen, 468 S.E.2d at 192 (Sears, J., dissenting).
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rights. Such personal sovereignty is guaranteed by the
Constitution when it refers to the people, as opposed to the States
and the United States. Freedom, liberty, and morality may take
different shape through successive generations based on the
cumulative and contemporaneous experiences of the society. An
important purpose of the Constitution is its ability to offer
minorities an avenue to live their lives - without hardship
stemming from undue prejudice - and to have a say in the political
decisions that may affect them.
The Bill of Rights largely protects minorities from being
unjustly controlled by the personally held viewpoints of the
governing or popular majority.68 "The existence of moral
disapproval for certain types of behavior is the very fact that
disables government from regulating it."69  "Majority opinion
should never dictate a free society's willingness to battle for the
protection of its citizen's liberties. To allow such a thing would, in
and of itself, be an immoral and insulting affront to our
constitutional democracy., 70  When analyzing the rights of
homosexuals, courts must determine the limits of morality's
legitimacy in the law and whether the laws enacted violate one's
personal liberties or rights of equal protection.
7 1
IV. LIBERTY, PRIVACY, AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Bowers resulted from a Georgia sodomy statute that
criminalized the private conduct at issue. Although the state did
not reject this statute until 1993, Georgia boasts of its rich and
68 See Christensen, 468 S.E.2d at 196 n.29 ("The very purpose of the Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials ..
(quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637-38).
69Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397. Although this argument did not help the
appellant, a U.S. Navy officer discharged due to homosexual conduct, convince
the government that this was reason enough to allow homosexuals in the
military, it does soundly reflect the theory that the Bill of Rights protects the
minority from the majority.
70 Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 27 (Sears, J., concurring).
71 See Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d. at 362 n.38 (explaining how other "immoral"
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progressive history of appellate privacy jurisprudence.72 The state
line of cases began in 1905 with Pavesich v. New England Life, 71
where the court held that the right of personal liberty embraces the
right "to withdraw from the public gaze at such times as a person
may see fit, when his presence in public is not demanded by any
rule of law . . .4. The Georgia privacy right has been described
as:
[P]rotection for the individual from unnecessary
public scrutiny;75  to be free from.., the
publicizing of one's private affairs with which the
public has no legitimate concern; 76 the right to
define one's circle of intimacy; 77 and to be
protected from any wrongful intrusion into an
individual's private life which would outrage... a
person of ordinary sensibilities.78
The Georgia right of privacy is recognized as a fundamental
constitutional right, "having a value so essential to individual
liberty in our society that [its] infringement merits careful scrutiny
by the courts."
79
In Bowers, the Court described the nature of rights
qualifying for heightened judicial protection: rights that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed,' 80 or those
liberties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."'', It is clear which definition the Court leaned more
towards: it is doubtful that a convincing argument can be made to
72 Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21.
73 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
74 Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 22 (quoting Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70).75 Id. (citing Athens Observer v. Anderson, 263 S.E.2d 128 (Ga. 1980)).
76 Id. (citing Gouldman-Taber Pontiac v. Zerbst; 100 S.E.2d 881 (Ga. 1957)).
77 Id. (citing Macon-Bibb County Water & Sewerage Auth. v. Reynolds, 299
S.E.2d 594 (Ga. App. 1983)).
78 Id. (citing Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 254 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979)).
79 Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 21-22 (citing Ambles v. State, 383 S.E.2d 585 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1989)).
go Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325-26 (1937)).
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declare homosexual sodomy "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition." It is, however more plausible that such conduct
could be covered under a fundamental right to intimate privacy, if
such privacy is determined to be "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." So far, fundamental rights have been extended to
"personal decisions 'relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships ... child rearing, and
education."
8 2
It is possible that some sort of sexual privacy is developing
in state and federal jurisprudence. Perhaps a federal privacy right
to intimate association could fall under the category of "family"
which is already protected by the Federal Constitution. Consider
two people who love each other and live together as a family; they
may in fact be married, raising children, working together, buying
property, and going on vacation together. How can the law
withdraw certain benefits and protections if these two people are of
the same sex?
The Bowers decision may seem to have limited federal
protection for homosexual sodomy, but the Supreme Court may
have opened up a promising gateway to protection for
homosexuals when it decided Romer v. Evans on equal protection
grounds.8 3 The Court in Romer did not consider homosexuals to
be a suspect class for whom a heightened level of scrutiny would
be applied under an equal protection challenge, but the legislation
failed the rational basis test, the court's lowest and most deferential
level -of scrutiny.84 The Court found no reason, let alone a rational
reason, as to how the challenged legislation could possibly be
rationally related to a legitimate government objective.8 5  The
Court concluded the only apparent motivation for the legislation
was a biased animus based on stereotypical traits of a class
defined not only by one's conduct but possibly even by one's
thoughts, tendencies, inclination and curiosity.8 7 The disadvantage
imposed was found to have been "born of animosity toward the
82 Casey, 505 U.S. at 859 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85).
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class of persons affected' and for that reason was found to be
invalid."8
Even though homosexuals did not comprise a suspect class
in Romer, they were determined to be classified and discriminated
against, which sounds like a construction of a class that merits at
least heightened scrutiny in challenges to legislation that affects
the class. The federal definition of a suspect class is a discrete and
insular group that has immutable characteristics, that is powerless
in the political process, and that has a history of discrimination.
89
The federal suspect classification has basically only applied to
race, alienage, and natural origin.90 The states are free to extend
rights beyond the requirements of the constitution or the federal
judiciary. For instance, in Oregon, suspect classes have been
defined as "socially recognized groups that have been the subject
of adverse social or political stereotyping or prejudice."
91
Sex and gender classifications under the U.S. Constitution
receive a heightened, (although not strict) level of scrutiny.92
Review of sex and gender classifications seems obvious at first
glance; it often applies to legislation that classifies males and
females as two separate groups. However, the classification is not
clearly defined when applied to same-sex issues. The dissent in
the Lawrence case pointed out this disparity while discussing the
Texas statute which criminalizes same-sex sodomy only:
The simple fact is, the same behavior is criminal for
some but not for others, based solely on the sex of
the individuals who engage in the behavior. In
other words, the sex of the individual, not the
conduct, is the sole determinant of the criminality of
the conduct.
93
88 Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
89 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938) (discussing the need for a "more searching judicial inquiry" into
legislation that classifies certain groups that have traditionally been victims of
proudice).
Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 367-68.
9' Tanner, 971 P.2d at 446.
92 See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (O'Connor, J.
dissenting) (stating that "for nearly three decades, [the] Court has applied
heightened scrutiny to legislative classifications based on sex.").
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The Equal Protection Clause requires similar treatment for
persons similarly situated.94 If women who want to marry women
can be seen as similarly situated with men who want to marry
women, then a challenge to a ban on same-sex marriages under
equal protection should receive heightened scrutiny and the state
will have to show more than just a rational relationship between
the legislation and a legitimate state objective. If there is an
argument to be made that laws proscribing same-sex marriages are
not even rationally related to a legitimate state objective,9 there
seems a good chance that under heightened scrutiny, the Supreme
Court and state courts would have a harder time justifying or
rationalizing a proscription against same-sex marriage. The
Bowers decision notwithstanding, the result would be protection of
homosexual conduct through the Equal Protection Clause and
through the fundamental right of privacy in marriage found within
the concept of 'liberty' of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.96
V. CONCLUSION
The states' power to proscribe conduct, even some sexual
conduct, can not seriously be questioned. 97 The question is: does
the state or legislative act infringe upon rights retained or reserved
by the people through the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment? While jurisprudence in this area of law continues to
unfold, it is clear that people have the right to and a need for
definitive justice. There is a trend towards an acceptance of sexual
privacy, both socially and legally. "Homosexuality is no longer
viewed by mental health professionals as a "disease" or
disorder." 98  However, to homosexuals who fear criminal
prosecution in Texas and Louisiana, and to same-sex couples who
94See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 United States 438, 454 (1972).
95 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (appellant arguing that moral beliefs, relative to
consensual same-sex conduct, do not comprise a rational basis).96 See, e.g., Powell, 510 S.E.2d 18; Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,415 N.E.2d 936.
97 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (referring to a State's
proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct).
98 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Amici Curiae




Touro Law Review, Vol. 19 [2003], No. 1, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss1/9
SEXUAL PRIVACY
want to marry outside of Vermont, the law not only fails to keep up
with the times, but reinforces the stereotype that there is something
wrong with same-sex conduct.
Whether same-sex relationships and conduct will continue
to be validated by more states or even the federal government
remains to be seen. However, not to do so deprives a class of
citizens of basic rights and liberty enjoyed by their families and
neighbors. "The freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."99 "Only the most willful blindness could
obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is 'a sensitive key relationship
of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and
the development of human personality.' "100
The Roe Court spoke of how one's thinking and
conclusions are colored by one's life and its relevance when
analyzing relevant issues: "One's philosophy, one's experiences,
one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's
religious training, one's attitudes towards life and family and their
values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to
observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's
thinking ... ,01
Laws that affect a person's privacy must be carefully
considered. The potential effects can be more far-reaching and
disastrous than oppressing an unpopular class of people. Our
governmental system and law itself are undermined. Our
government is in place to protect freedom, equality, and liberty.
This means giving all persons a chance to be liberated from the
constraints of ignorance, oppression, and prejudice. This also
means being free from undue prying or control by the authorities.
Certainly, where the government does not or can not achieve these
objectives, it should not be fostering these negative concepts. If
the aim is protecting liberty, the government can not define or rely
too heavily on morality in its lawmaking. A democratic
government that does so disserves the people:
99 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
100 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1974)).
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Criminal statutes... which are defined based upon
the body parts involved during private consensual
sex, which are ignored and ridiculed by the
populace, and which are enforced with
discriminatory selectivity, can only breed contempt
and foster disdain and disrespect for the law, the
State, and the law enforcement community.1
0 2
Lawrence v. Texas, the Texas Court of Appeals decision
that is now under review by the Supreme Court, followed the
federal Bowers decision and upheld the conviction of two men
found to be engaged in "deviate sexual intercourse" as the police
entered a residence investigating a "weapons disturbance." 0 3 It
remains to be seen whether the Court's decision will be narrowed
to a Fourth Amendment illegal search and seizure issue or whether
it will be broad enough to actually advance jurisprudence in this
area of law by encompassing and protecting privacy, equal
protection, and other important rights of the people that are
implicated by this case.
102 Christensen, 467 S.E.2d at 528.
103 Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 350.
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